Dynamics and Equilibrium
(A Presentation)

Sergiu Hart

Acrobat PDF file

Presidential Address at GAMES 2008, The Thirld World Congress of the Game Theory Society
July 2008

Expanded and Revised: February 2009

Further expanded: 2009, 2013


An overview of a body of work on dynamical systems in multi-player environments. On the one hand, the natural informational restriction that each participant does not know the payoff functions of the other participants — "uncoupledness" — severely limits the possibilities to converge to Nash equilibria. On the other hand, there are simple adaptive heuristics — such as "regret matching" — that lead in the long run to correlated equilibria, a concept that embodies full rationality. Connections to behavioral economics, neurobiological studies, and engineering, are also mentioned.

Some technical information on the presentation


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© Sergiu Hart