



# **Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics**

**Sergiu Hart**

**June 2008**

**Conference in Honor of John Nash's 80th Birthday**

**Opening Panel**

# NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND DYNAMICS

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# Nash equilibrium

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*John Nash, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton 1950*

# Nash equilibrium

**EQUILIBRIUM POINT:**

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*John Nash, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton 1950*

# Nash equilibrium

## EQUILIBRIUM POINT:

**"Each player's strategy is optimal against those of the others."**

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*John Nash, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton 1950*



# Nash equilibrium

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- **NON-COOPERATIVE**

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**"absence of coalitions,  
communication, and side-payments"**

# Nash equilibrium

- **NON-COOPERATIVE**

**"absence of coalitions,  
communication, and side-payments"**

- → "*Nash Program*":  
non-cooperative foundation and  
implementation of cooperative approaches

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- **"MASS-ACTION" INTERPRETATION**

# Nash equilibrium

- **NON-COOPERATIVE**
- **"MASS-ACTION" INTERPRETATION**
- **"RATIONAL" INTERPRETATION**

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**"prediction of the behavior to be expected of rational playing the game"**



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**"we need to assume the players know the full structure of the game"**

# Nash equilibrium

- **NON-COOPERATIVE**
- **"MASS-ACTION" INTERPRETATION**
- **"RATIONAL" INTERPRETATION**

**"prediction of the behavior to be expected of rational playing the game"**

**"we need to assume the players know the full structure of the game ... quite strongly a rationalistic and idealising interpretation"**

# Nash equilibrium

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- knows his own payoff function

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Then these choices constitute  
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*Aumann and Brandenburger 1995*

# Dynamics

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***There are no general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium***

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*There are no **general**, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

- *"general"*

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(rather than: for specific classes of games)

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- *"natural"*

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  - simple, efficient (time, computation, ...)
  - *"uncoupled"*

# Uncoupled dynamics

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Each player knows *only* his own payoff function

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*Hart and Mas-Colell 2003*

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- impossibility results

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*Hart and Mas-Colell 2003, 2006*

# Uncoupled dynamics

## UNCOUPLED DYNAMICS :

Each player knows **only** his own payoff function  
(does *not* know the others' payoff functions)

- impossibility results
- how long? exponential time

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*Hart and Mansour 2008*

# Dynamics

# Dynamics

**FACT:**

***There are no general, natural dynamics  
leading to Nash equilibrium***

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**RESULT:**

# Dynamics

## FACT:

*There **are no** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

## RESULT:

*There **cannot be** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

# Correlated equilibrium

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## CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM

*Aumann 1974*



# Correlated equilibrium

## CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM :

Nash equilibrium when players receive payoff-irrelevant information before the game

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- "Law of Conservation of Coordination"

# Correlated equilibrium

## CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM :

Nash equilibrium when players receive payoff-irrelevant information before the game

- *There are general, natural dynamics leading to correlated equilibria*
- "Law of Conservation of Coordination":  
There must be some "coordination" – either in the solution concept, or in the dynamic



***HAPPY BIRTHDAY, JOHN!***